Annexures

See additional Annexures added September 2025, A1, A2, A3, etc for council related matters.

Schedule of Annexures

  1. Annexure COA RC1_ColBlanchNotice01 (Rod Culleton Notice 1)
  2. Annexure COA RC2_ColBlanchNotice02-Reminder-to-Notice-of-Constitutional-Departure-Police-Official-Sep2023 (Rod Culleton Notice 2)
  3. Annexure COA RC3_ColBlanchNotice03-Reminder-to-Notice-of-Constitutional-Departure-Police-Official-Sep2023 (Rod Culleton Notice 3)
  4. Annexure COA RC4_ColBlanchNotice04-of-Legislative-Assurance-Constitutional-Prohibition-CoP-Dec2023 (Rod Culleton Notice 4)
  5. Annexure COA DD_SelectExtractsConstitutionalReport1988-DD (Constitutional Report 1988 Select Extracts)
  6. Annexure COA SROWA Cons5652 74-1995 2 (Royal Assent LGA1995 WA)
  7. Annexure COA LGA_RA_VIC (Royal Assent LGA2020 VIC)
  8. Annexure COA LGA Local-Government-Act-No.-17-of-2009-QLD-Royal-Assent (Royal Assent LGA2009 QLD)
  9. Annexure COA 09 PUBLIC GOVERNANCE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 2013 (NO. 123, 2013) – SECT 11 Types of Commonwealth entities (Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 s11, “Corporate Commonwealth entities are legally separate from the Commonwealth”)
  10. Removed by request.
  11. Annexure COA 11 Browning v ANZ – Registrar no judicial authority (Registrar no judicial authority)
  12. Fact_sheet_No_12_Highlighted (Australian Government Solicitors Fact Sheet, all govco bound by Australian Consumer Law)
  13. Annexure COA 13 Addendum RC_ColBlanchNotice03BAddendum-References-for-Constitutional-Authority.pdf (Addendum with RC Notices)
  14. Senate_2022_07_26_Official (Hansard of the 47th Parliament – minus Members Oaths of Office)
  15. Annexure 3 (2 page letter 10.6.1999 by Robyn Webber, Director, Chamber Research Office, Parliament House, Canberra, one of 35 Annexures published in the book “Australia – the Concealed Colony”.)
  16. Annexure COA 16 Sir_harry_gibbs_letter_1995 (letter response from Sir Harry Gibbs to John Wilson 1995)
  17. Annexure COA 17 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (inc Covering Clauses 1 to 8 and Constitution)
  18. Annexure COA 18 Grattan Institute New-politics-A-better-process-for-public-appointments Nolan/Fitzgerald Principles highlighted on pages 6, 7.

2025 Annexures set related to council matters

These are AI generated. You MUST check all references as they are sometimes incorrect. While most of the information has been checked, and LGAs for each state have been loaded into the AI for accuracy, there can still be errors.

ANNEXURES – INDEX AND COVER SHEET (corrected 12.9.2025)

Matter: [Insert Case Title & Number]
Deponent: John Henry
Filed on behalf of: [Party]
Date: [Insert Date]


A1 – Bill of Rights 1688 Extract
• s 11: fines and forfeitures illegal before conviction.
• Applies nationally: Imperial Acts Application Acts (WA 1984, Qld 1984, NSW 1969, Vic 1980, Tas 1980); by reception in SA & NT.

A2 – ICCPR Article 14(1) & (2)
• Right to fair and public hearing; presumption of innocence.
• Binding on Australia by ratification in 1980.

A3 – Brandy v HREOC (1995) 183 CLR 245
• High Court: non-judicial bodies cannot conclusively determine or enforce liabilities.
• Judicial supervision under Ch III Constitution required.

A4 – Parliamentary Infosheet No. 23
• Principles: constitutional monarchy, rule of law, due process (Magna Carta heritage), separation of powers, limits on executive power.

A5 – Constitutional Commission Reports 1988
• Raised concerns about substitution of “Queen of Australia” without referendum (s 128 Constitution).
• Confirmed such change requires people’s approval.

A6 – Case Law Extracts
Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) — jurisdictional error voids decisions.
Anisminic v FCC — ultra vires administrative acts are nullities.
Plaintiff S157 v Commonwealth — privative clauses cannot oust judicial review.

A7 – Consolidated Statutory Extracts (Infringement/Expiation Schemes)
• WA: LGA 1995 ss 9.16–9.24 — disputes to Magistrates Court.
• Qld: LGA 2009 s 133; SPE Act 1999 — disputes to Magistrates Court.
• NSW: LGA 1993 s 679(3); Fines Act 1996 — disputes to Local Court.
• Vic: LGA 2020 s 243; Infringements Act 2006 — disputes to Magistrates’ Court.
• Tas: LGA 1993 ss 204–205(4); MPE Act 2005 — disputes to Magistrates Court.
• NT: LGA 2019 s 272; Fines and Penalties (Recovery) Act 2001 — disputes to court.
• SA: LGA 1999 s 261(h); Expiation of Offences Act 1996 ss 6–10 (s 8) — disputes to Magistrates Court.
• All are administrative only and require judicial adjudication if disputed.


This index is annexed to the affidavit of John Henry affirmed/sworn on [insert date].

Witness: ___________________________  Deponent: ___________________________
(Signature of authorised witness)        (Signature of John Henry)

 

  • Annexure A8 (additional, not in previous set)
    • Based on AGS Fact Sheet 12
  • Annexure A9 (additional, not in previous set)
    • Based on AGS Fact Sheet 17
  • Annexure A10 (additional, not in previous set)
    • Based on AGS Fact Sheet 3 Land Aquisitions Act

Annexure A1 – Bill of Rights 1688 Extract

Matter: [Insert Case Title & Number]
Deponent: John Henry
Annexure Reference: A1


Bill of Rights 1688 (1 Will & Mary Sess 2 c 2)

Citation: 1 William & Mary Sess 2 c 2 — An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown
Enacted: 16 December 1689 (Old Style) — from the 1688 parliamentary session


Relevant Provision – Section 11 (Fines and Forfeitures Illegal)

“all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction are illegal and void.”


Other Key Declarations of Rights (contextual)

  • The pretended power of suspending of laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority without consent of Parliament, is illegal.

  • Levying money for or to the use of the Crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of Parliament, for longer time, or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal.

  • Excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.


Legal Authority in Australia

  • The Bill of Rights 1688 is a fundamental constitutional instrument forming part of the law in force in Australia.

  • It is in force under the following Imperial Acts Application Acts:

    • Imperial Acts Application Act 1984 (Qld)

    • Imperial Acts Application Act 1980 (Vic)

    • Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW)

    • Imperial Acts Application Act 1984 (WA)

    • Imperial Acts Application Act 1980 (Tas)

  • It also forms part of the law in South Australia and the Northern Territory by reception at settlement as part of the general law of England in force so far as applicable and not displaced by valid local legislation.

  • Its continuing operation has been recognised by the High Court of Australia, notably in Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 242 CLR 195.


Application Across All Jurisdictions

  • The Bill of Rights 1688 applies uniformly throughout Australia as a constraint on executive and administrative power.

  • It renders unlawful any forfeiture, fine, or demand treated as final before conviction in a competent court of record.

  • This applies equally to all agencies, officers, councils, and statutory bodies in every State and Territory.


This is the annexure marked “A1” referred to in the affidavit of John Henry sworn/affirmed on [date].

Witness: ___________________________
(Signature of authorised witness)

Deponent: ___________________________
(Signature of John Henry)

Annexure A2 – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) – Article 14(1) & (2)

Matter: [Insert Case Title & Number]
Deponent: John Henry
Annexure Reference: A2


Instrument Details

Instrument: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Adopted: 16 December 1966 by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI)
Entered into force: 23 March 1976
Australia: Signed 18 December 1972; ratified 13 August 1980


Relevant Provisions – Article 14(1) and (2)

Article 14(1):

“All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

Article 14(2):

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”


Legal Authority in Australia

  • The ICCPR is a binding international treaty on Australia since its ratification in 1980.

  • While not self-executing, its provisions inform the interpretation of Australian statutes and common law and guide the exercise of public power.

  • Australian courts, including the High Court, have recognised that ratified treaties may create legitimate expectations that public decision-makers will act consistently with them (Minister for Immigration v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273).

  • Public authorities, including local government councils and agencies, are expected to act consistently with Australia’s obligations under the ICCPR.


Application Across All Jurisdictions

  • Article 14(1) and (2) are binding throughout Australia and apply to all public authorities and administrative decision-makers.

  • These provisions require:

    • That any person accused of an offence is given a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, and

    • That every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law.

  • Administrative penalty, infringement, or expiation notices issued by councils cannot be treated as conclusive of liability without a hearing in a court of record.


This is the annexure marked “A2” referred to in the affidavit of John Henry sworn/affirmed on [date].

Witness: ___________________________
(Signature of authorised witness)

Deponent: ___________________________
(Signature of John Henry)

Annexure A3 – Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245

Matter: [Insert Case Title & Number]
Deponent: John Henry
Annexure Reference: A3


Case Citation

Full citation: Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245
Court: High Court of Australia
Decision date: 23 February 1995


Background

  • The case concerned amendments to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) that allowed the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) to make determinations about racial discrimination complaints.

  • Under the scheme, those determinations could be registered in the Federal Court, and once registered they would have the same effect as a Federal Court order — including enforceability.

  • Mr Brandy challenged the validity of this scheme, arguing that it conferred judicial power on a non-judicial body.


High Court’s Decision

  • The High Court unanimously found the scheme invalid.

  • The Court held that allowing HREOC determinations to be registered and enforced as Federal Court orders conferred judicial power on HREOC, which is not a Chapter III court.

  • The Court ruled that:

    • Only courts established under Chapter III of the Constitution may exercise judicial power of the Commonwealth.

    • Administrative bodies such as HREOC may investigate and recommend, but cannot make binding and enforceable determinations.


Key Legal Principle Established

  • Non-judicial bodies cannot exercise judicial power by having their determinations automatically become enforceable as court orders.

  • Enforcement of liabilities requires judicial supervision.

  • This decision confirms the strict separation of judicial power in Australia’s constitutional system.


Application Across All Jurisdictions

  • Brandy is binding authority throughout Australia.

  • It confirms that no administrative agency, statutory body, or local council may conclusively determine and enforce liability without judicial adjudication.

  • Any attempt to treat penalty, infringement or expiation notices as final or conclusive of liability without the option of a hearing in a court of record is inconsistent with this principle and constitutionally invalid.


This is the annexure marked “A3” referred to in the affidavit of John Henry sworn/affirmed on [date].

Witness: ___________________________
(Signature of authorised witness)

Deponent: ___________________________
(Signature of John Henry)

Annexure A4 – Parliamentary Infosheet No. 23 (House of Representatives, Parliament of Australia)

Matter: [Insert Case Title & Number]
Deponent: John Henry
Annexure Reference: A4


Document Details

Title: Infosheet No. 23 – The Constitution
Publisher: Department of the House of Representatives, Parliament of Australia
Purpose: To provide a plain-language overview of the Australian constitutional framework.


Key Constitutional Principles Identified

Constitutional Monarchy

  • Australia is a constitutional monarchy in which the Head of State is the monarch named in the Constitution.

  • The Constitution originally referred to the Queen of the United Kingdom; this was administratively altered to “Queen of Australia” without a referendum under section 128 of the Constitution, as noted in the 1988 Constitutional Commission Reports.

Responsible Government

  • Ministers are responsible to Parliament, and Parliament is accountable to the people.

  • Executive agencies must operate under lawful authority conferred by Parliament and within constitutional limits.

Rule of Law

  • Everyone, including government officials and lawmakers, is subject to the law.

  • No person may be punished except by judgment of a court after a finding of a breach of law.

  • This embodies the heritage of the Magna Carta, including:

    • Liberty of Subject Act 1354 — none shall be condemned without due process of law.

    • Observance of Due Process of Law Act 1368 — none shall be put to answer without due process of law.

Separation of Powers

  • The legislature (Parliament), executive (government), and judiciary (courts) have separate and distinct powers.

  • Judicial power can only be exercised by courts, not by executive or administrative bodies.

Parliamentary Sovereignty within Constitutional Limits

  • Parliament may make laws, but laws inconsistent with the Constitution are invalid.

  • The High Court acts as the constitutional guardian by striking down unconstitutional laws.

  • Executive action taken without valid legislative authority or contrary to the Constitution is unlawful.


Legal Effect and Application

  • Infosheet No. 23 is an official publication summarising the foundational legal principles governing all public authorities in Australia.

  • It affirms that administrative agencies, officers, and councils must act only within authority conferred by Parliament, and that authority must be constitutionally valid.

  • This principle directly limits the ability of local government bodies to act as if they possess judicial power or to enforce liabilities without adjudication in a court of law.


This is the annexure marked “A4” referred to in the affidavit of John Henry sworn/affirmed on [date].

Witness: ___________________________
(Signature of authorised witness)

Deponent: ___________________________
(Signature of John Henry)

Annexure A5 – Constitutional Commission Reports 1988 Extract

Matter: [Insert Case Title & Number]
Deponent: John Henry
Annexure Reference: A5


Document Details

Title: Constitutional Commission – Final Reports (1988)
Publisher: Constitutional Commission, Commonwealth of Australia
Purpose: To review the Australian Constitution and propose potential amendments for consideration by the Australian people.
Relevance: Provides authoritative commentary on the legal structure of the Commonwealth and the process required to amend the Constitution under section 128.


Key Extracts and Findings

Creation of the “Queen of Australia”

  • The Reports noted the substitution of the title “Queen of Australia” in several Commonwealth and State statutes during the 1970s and 1980s.

  • The Commission expressly questioned whether the Parliament could validly create a new sovereign title without the approval of the Australian people.

  • It warned that changing the title of the monarch named in the Constitution could constitute an alteration to the Constitution itself.

Requirement for Referendum under Section 128

  • The Commission reaffirmed that any alteration of the Constitution must be submitted to the electors and approved by referendum under section 128 of the Constitution.

  • It emphasised that symbolic or practical changes to the identity of the sovereign cannot be validly made by legislation alone, because this would alter the fundamental structure of the Constitution without the people’s consent.

Oath of Allegiance Concerns

  • The Reports also raised concern that revising oaths and statutory references from “Queen of the United Kingdom” to “Queen of Australia” may not be constitutionally effective unless approved under section 128.

  • This created legal uncertainty as to the continuity of allegiance and executive authority.


Legal Significance

  • These findings demonstrate that the constitutional identity of the Crown cannot be altered by executive or legislative action alone.

  • They reinforce the principle that the sovereignty of the people is paramount, and no purported change to the foundational elements of the Constitution is lawful without the approval of the electors by referendum.


This is the annexure marked “A5” referred to in the affidavit of John Henry sworn/affirmed on [date].

Witness: ___________________________
(Signature of authorised witness)

Deponent: ___________________________
(Signature of John Henry)

Annexure A6 – Case Law Extracts

Matter: [Insert Case Title & Number]
Deponent: John Henry
Annexure Reference: A6


Case 1 – Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531

Court: High Court of Australia
Decision date: 3 February 2010

Key Points:

  • The High Court held that jurisdictional error renders a decision invalid and of no legal effect.

  • It confirmed that State Supreme Courts must retain their entrenched supervisory jurisdiction to review administrative decisions for jurisdictional error.

  • A State Parliament cannot remove or curtail this supervisory jurisdiction.

Significance:

  • This case affirms that no statutory or administrative scheme can oust judicial review where a decision-maker has exceeded their lawful power.

  • Decisions affected by jurisdictional error are nullities from the outset.


Case 2 – Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147

Court: House of Lords (United Kingdom)
Decision date: 17 December 1968

Key Points:

  • The House of Lords ruled that any error of law by an administrative decision-maker that goes to their jurisdiction renders the decision a nullity.

  • A privative or ouster clause cannot protect a decision made in excess of jurisdiction.

Significance:

  • This case is a foundational authority in Australian administrative law and has been adopted in High Court reasoning.

  • It confirms that an act done without legal authority is void and incapable of legal effect.


Case 3 – Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Court: High Court of Australia
Decision date: 4 February 2003

Key Points:

  • The High Court held that privative clauses cannot exclude judicial review for jurisdictional error.

  • Section 75(v) of the Constitution guarantees the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition and injunction against Commonwealth officers.

Significance:

  • This decision entrenches the constitutional right of access to the courts for judicial review of unlawful administrative action.

  • Attempts to shield decisions from review cannot succeed where the decision is affected by jurisdictional error.


Combined Principle of A6 Cases

  • These three cases collectively establish that:

    • Administrative decisions beyond jurisdiction are nullities.

    • Judicial review of jurisdictional error cannot be removed or limited by legislation.

    • Courts of record remain the ultimate arbiters of legal liability and must be available to review executive or administrative action.


This is the annexure marked “A6” referred to in the affidavit of John Henry sworn/affirmed on [date].

Witness: ___________________________
(Signature of authorised witness)

Deponent: ___________________________
(Signature of John Henry)

Annexure A7 – Consolidated Statutory Extracts (Local Government Infringement / Expiation Schemes)

Matter: [Insert Case Title & Number]
Deponent: John Henry
Annexure Reference: A7


Purpose and Relevance

This annexure consolidates the key statutory provisions governing local government infringement, penalty and expiation schemes across all Australian States and Territories.
It demonstrates that such notices are administrative only and cannot constitute proof or conclusive determination of liability.
Where a person disputes liability, the matter must be referred to and determined by a court of record before any enforcement can lawfully proceed.


Western Australia

Statute: Local Government Act 1995 (WA)

  • Sections 9.16–9.24 authorise councils to issue infringement notices for breaches of local laws.

  • Section 9.19 provides that a person who disputes the matter may elect to have it heard in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia.
    Enforcement: Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA) applies only after registration of an unpaid notice.
    Key Point: Infringement notices are administrative only; liability must be determined judicially.


Queensland

Statutes:

  • Local Government Act 2009 (Qld)

    • Sections 95–98 allow councils to levy rates and charges.

    • Section 133 confirms that rates are recoverable as a debt in a court of competent jurisdiction.

  • State Penalties Enforcement Act 1999 (Qld)

    • Councils may issue infringement notices which are administrative only.

    • If disputed, matters must be referred to the Magistrates Court of Queensland.
      Enforcement: State Penalties Enforcement Registry (SPER) acts only after registration and does not constitute a finding of guilt.
      Key Point: Liability must be established by a court, not presumed from unpaid notices.


New South Wales

Statutes:

  • Local Government Act 1993 (NSW)

    • Section 679(3) provides that if a person elects to have a penalty notice heard by a court, the notice is withdrawn and the matter must proceed to the Local Court of NSW.

  • Fines Act 1996 (NSW) governs the enforcement of unpaid penalties by Revenue NSW.
    Key Point: Penalty notices are administrative only; liability requires adjudication in the Local Court.


Victoria

Statutes:

  • Local Government Act 2020 (Vic)

    • Section 243 provides that where an infringement is contested, proceedings must be taken in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria.

  • Infringements Act 2006 (Vic)

    • Sections 16–17 allow a person to elect to have the matter heard in open court.

    • Sections 46–52 allow enforcement (via Sheriff) only after registration of the unpaid penalty.
      Key Point: Infringement notices are administrative only; enforcement requires prior judicial determination or registration.


Tasmania

Statutes:

  • Local Government Act 1993 (Tas)

    • Sections 204–205, especially s 205(4), provide that if a person elects to have an infringement heard by a court, the notice ceases to have effect and proceedings must be taken in the Magistrates Court of Tasmania.

  • Monetary Penalties Enforcement Act 2005 (Tas) governs post-registration enforcement.
    Key Point: Infringement notices are administrative only and do not establish liability unless confirmed in court.


Northern Territory

Statutes:

  • Local Government Act 2019 (NT)

    • Section 272 provides that a person who receives an infringement notice may elect to have the matter heard and determined by a court.

  • Fines and Penalties (Recovery) Act 2001 (NT) governs enforcement after registration.
    Key Point: Infringement notices are administrative only; liability must be determined in court.


South Australia

Statutes:

  • Local Government Act 1999 (SA)

    • Section 261(h) allows councils to issue expiation notices.

  • Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (SA)

    • Section 6 sets out the requirements and form of expiation notices.

    • Section 8 confirms that a person may elect to be prosecuted instead of expiating, and the matter must be heard in the Magistrates Court of South Australia.
      Key Point: Expiation notices are administrative only and not proof of liability.


Combined Principle

Across all Australian jurisdictions:

  • Local government infringement / expiation / penalty notices are not judicial determinations.

  • They are administrative only and have no legal effect as proof of liability unless and until the matter is adjudicated by a court of record.

  • This principle accords with:

    • Bill of Rights 1688 (s 11) — no fines or forfeitures before conviction,

    • ICCPR Article 14 — fair hearing and presumption of innocence, and

    • Brandy v HREOC (1995) 183 CLR 245 — non-judicial bodies cannot conclusively determine or enforce liabilities.


This is the annexure marked “A7” referred to in the affidavit of John Henry sworn/affirmed on [date].

Witness: ___________________________
(Signature of authorised witness)

Deponent: ___________________________
(Signature of John Henry)

Annexure A8 – Australian Consumer Law (Fact Sheet No. 12)

Source: Fact Sheet No. 12 – Australian Consumer Law, Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), Schedule 2.


1. National Consumer Protection Framework

  • The Australian Consumer Law (ACL) commenced on 1 July 2010, fully operative from 1 January 2011, as a uniform, national consumer protection regime.

  • It is enacted as Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

  • It applies across all States and Territories via application legislation (e.g., State/Territory Fair Trading Acts), ensuring consistent coverage nationwide.

  • It binds not only private businesses but also the Crown in right of the Commonwealth and States/Territories where they engage in business activities.


2. Core Protections under the ACL

The ACL enshrines statutory rights and remedies, including:

  • Misleading or deceptive conduct (s 18).

  • Unconscionable conduct in trade or commerce (ss 20–22).

  • Consumer guarantees for goods and services (ss 51–68).

  • Unfair contract terms (ss 23–28).

  • Product safety and information standards.

  • Remedies and redress: injunctions, compensation, declarations, and pecuniary penalties.


3. Enforcement Powers

  • The ACL provides a wide range of enforcement mechanisms:

    • Civil penalties up to millions of dollars.

    • Compensation orders for affected consumers.

    • Injunctions restraining unlawful conduct.

    • Regulatory tools: substantiation notices, public warnings, enforceable undertakings.

    • Infringement notices (Competition and Consumer Act 2010, s 134A) — allowing regulators to impose administrative penalties for alleged contraventions.


4. Constitutional and Due Process Concerns

  • While designed for efficiency, infringement notices and administrative enforcement under the ACL raise the same concerns addressed in Annexures A1–A7:

    • Bill of Rights 1688 (s 11): prohibits fines and forfeitures before conviction.

    • ICCPR Article 14: guarantees due process and presumption of innocence.

    • Infosheet 23: requires adherence to the rule of law and judicial determination before punishment.

    • Brandy v HREOC (1995): prohibits administrative bodies from issuing enforceable determinations without judicial supervision.


5. Implications for Local Government and Administrative Schemes

  • The ACL underscores Parliament’s recognition that consumer fairness, due process, and judicial oversight are vital in enforcement.

  • However, regulators (such as the ACCC, ASIC, and State/Territory Fair Trading bodies) are empowered to impose infringement notices administratively, without a prior judicial finding of liability.

  • This mirrors the constitutional tensions identified in State/Territory local government infringement and penalty schemes (Annexures A7).

  • Such mechanisms are therefore vulnerable to challenge where they purport to substitute administrative enforcement for judicial adjudication.


Conclusion

Fact Sheet No. 12 confirms that while the ACL provides broad consumer protections, it also expands the administrative penalty model. This brings it into tension with:

  • The Bill of Rights 1688,

  • ICCPR Article 14,

  • Magna Carta and due process principles, and

  • The High Court’s doctrine in **Brandy v HREOC.

Judicial process remains essential for constitutionally valid enforcement of liability.


This is the annexure marked “A8” referred to in the affidavit of John Henry sworn/affirmed on [date].

Witness: ___________________________
(Signature of authorised witness)

Deponent: ___________________________
(Signature of John Henry)

Annexure A9 – AGS Fact Sheet No. 17 (Officer’s Duty)

Source: Fact Sheet No. 17 – Officer’s Duty, Australian Government Solicitor, drawing upon the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) and harmonised model laws.


1. Officers’ Legal Responsibilities

  • Officers of Commonwealth bodies (and by extension, officers of State and Territory public authorities under harmonised WHS laws) are legally required to exercise due diligence to ensure that their entity complies with all relevant legal duties.

  • “Officer” includes senior public servants, statutory office holders, and managers who make or participate in significant decisions affecting the whole or a substantial part of the organisation.


2. Meaning of Due Diligence

Due diligence involves taking reasonable steps to:

  • Acquire and maintain up-to-date knowledge of the law.

  • Understand the operations of the entity and associated risks.

  • Ensure the entity has and uses appropriate resources and processes to comply with its duties.

  • Verify that such processes are implemented and followed.


3. Application to Local Government Enforcement

  • Officers of local councils and State agencies who issue infringement notices, expiation notices, or rate enforcement actions are bound by the same principles: they must exercise their powers within the scope of the law.

  • If an officer issues a notice or directs enforcement without legal authority, or in breach of constitutional limits, they fail in their duty of due diligence.

  • Such failure may expose the officer and their entity to liability, as unlawful acts are not protected by statutory office.


4. Constitutional and Jurisdictional Relevance

  • Bill of Rights 1688, s 11: forbids fines and forfeitures before conviction. An officer who disregards this protection acts unlawfully.

  • ICCPR Article 14: requires due process and presumption of innocence; officers must respect this in exercising enforcement powers.

  • Infosheet 23: stresses the rule of law—government officials are themselves bound by law.

  • Brandy v HREOC (1995): confirms that non-judicial officers cannot issue enforceable determinations.

  • Officers who attempt to enforce liability administratively, without judicial sanction, fail in their statutory duty of care and their constitutional obligations.


5. Practical Implications

  • Local government and agency officers cannot excuse unconstitutional conduct by claiming reliance on statutory schemes if those schemes conflict with higher law.

  • The duty of due diligence obliges officers to recognise the limits of their authority and to defer to judicial process where liability is disputed.

  • Enforcement that bypasses the courts is not only constitutionally defective but also contrary to an officer’s personal duty under WHS principles of governance and responsibility.


Conclusion

Fact Sheet No. 17 underscores that public officers have personal and institutional duties to act lawfully, responsibly, and with due diligence.

  • Administrative enforcement of penalties without judicial adjudication is incompatible with these duties.

  • Officers risk breaching their obligations, exposing themselves and their entities to liability, if they act ultra vires.

  • This reinforces the need for all penalties, forfeitures, or liabilities to be judicially determined in a court of record, not administratively imposed.


This is the annexure marked “A9” referred to in the affidavit of John Henry sworn/affirmed on [date].

Witness: ___________________________
(Signature of authorised witness)

Deponent: ___________________________
(Signature of John Henry)

Annexure A10 – AGS Fact Sheet No. 3: Lands Acquisition Act 1989 (Cth)

Source: Fact Sheet No. 3 – Lands Acquisition Act 1989, Australian Government Solicitor (July 2020)


1. Scope and Application of the Lands Acquisition Act 1989 (Cth)

  • The Lands Acquisition Act 1989 (Cth) governs most Commonwealth acquisitions and disposals of interests in land, including those related to exploration, mining, or property management.

  • It includes authority for temporary entry or occupation to assess land suitability.


2. Definition of “Interest” in Land

  • Under the Act, an “interest” in land broadly includes legal or equitable estates, easements, leases, restrictions, rights, charges, or privileges relating to land.

  • Even non-proprietary interests, such as licences or permits, may be captured.


3. Acquisition Approval Process

  • Any transaction involving acquisition or disposal of a land interest by a Commonwealth “acquiring authority” must comply with the Act’s approval process.

  • Approval may be required before entering a binding agreement, including via heads of agreement or correspondence.


4. Who Must Comply & Approval Authority

  • Acquiring authorities include:

    • Non-corporate Commonwealth entities acting in the name of the Commonwealth.

    • Corporate Commonwealth entities incorporated under Commonwealth or Territory law (unless exempt).

  • The Department of Finance administers the Act:

    • Some acquisitions (e.g., leases >22 years, compulsory acquisitions) require approval by the Finance Minister or delegate.


5. Constitutional & Administrative Relevance

  • The Act ensures that land acquisitions/disposals by government are subject to formal process, transparency, and oversight—essential components of the rule of law.

  • It mirrors foundational constitutional principles such as due process, accountable executive action, and legality of government conduct (as reinforced in Infosheet 23 and analogous to Base Bill of Rights norms).

  • Administrative agencies cannot bypass this process by informal agreement or excessive delegation—a concept consistent with Brandy’s separation of powers and AGS Fact Sheet No. 17’s officer duty to ensure compliance.


6. Practical Implications

  • If a council or agency (Commonwealth or State) acquires or disposes of land interests, compliance with LAA is mandatory.

  • Infringement or enforcement actions involving property (e.g., sale of land for unpaid rates) raise similar validation concerns—authorisation and process legitimacy are critical.

  • Including A10 provides reinforcement that property-related powers must be properly authorised and not exercised ultra vires.


This is the annexure marked “A10” referred to in the affidavit of John Henry sworn/affirmed on [date].

Witness: ___________________________
(Signature of authorised witness)

Deponent: ___________________________
(Signature of John Henry)

Disclosure Agreement

We no longer recommend using a formal Disclosure Agreement. 

Note on Disclosure Agreements

Disclosure Agreements requiring a responding party to execute a declaration of interests, allegiances, and affiliations before engaging with a formal notice are not recommended as a primary instrument in most matters.

The reason is structural. A Disclosure Agreement creates an obligation only if the other party accepts it. A government agency, ministerial office, or statutory body is under no legal duty to execute a document it did not agree to receive. Silence or refusal carries no legal consequence in itself — it does not create a default, it does not estop the agency from acting, and no court will treat non-execution as an admission. The agency simply ignores it, which is exactly what has occurred here.

Worse, its presence in a formal notice risks allowing the recipient to characterise the entire instrument as non-standard or irregular — providing a pretext for non-engagement that would not otherwise exist.

The Annexure DA remains on the record as evidence of John Henry’s good faith and commitment to transparent engagement. That is its value. It is not an enforceable instrument and should not be relied upon as one.

Where disclosure of conflicts and interests is genuinely required — for example where a decision-maker has a direct financial interest in the outcome — the correct instrument is a challenge to the decision on the ground of actual or apprehended bias, raised in judicial review proceedings before a court of competent jurisdiction. That instrument has teeth. A Disclosure Agreement does not.

Ubi jus, ibi remedium — find the right in a duty the law imposes. A disclosure obligation arises from bias law, not from a letter.

Last Updated 3 months ago

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