Read the complete document from the Wayback Machine https://web.archive.org/web/20170517014900/https://www8.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/1987/22.pdf as normal access appears to have been blocked (https://www8.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/1987/22.pdf).
THE CASE OF THE RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS –
THE CASE OF THE RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA
[A central bank does not sit easily within the Westminster system of government. While bearing a central responsibilityfor the manipulation of monetary and financial conditions for the public good, a central bank typically operates outside the traditional departmental structure and enjoys a wide capacity for independent action. This situation poses intriguing questions concerning accountability and control. The author analyses the position occupied by the Reserve Bank of Australia, as a Commonwealth statutory authority, within the executive arm of government and its enjoyment of Crown immunity. The widely accepted belief that central banks should be insulated from direct political interference is assessed in the light of the convention of responsible government. The author criticizes the dominance assumed by the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and suggests that the notion of responsible government is a dynamic concept capable of accommodating a diverse and evolving public sector without sacrificing its accountability or control.]
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